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" ••• the U.S. delegation began efforts on February 1, 1973 to obtain 
an accounting of the missing and the repatriation of remains of those 
listed as deceased (in the Vietnam conflict). The Communist delegations 
acknowledged their responsibility for this action but were not receptive 
to our overtures for early resolution of the problem." 
Dr. Roger E. Shields, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Economic Affairs 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: Lest we forget •••• approximately 1300 U.S. servicemen are still listed as 
missing in action in Southeast Asia and a significant number of them are known to have been 
caputred and in the hands of the enemy. Dr. Roger E. Shields, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Economic Affairs discusses efforts to learn of the persons or 
remains of these men in an ongoing effort. 
FEATURE: MIA - THE SEARCH FOR THE MISSING. 
"One year lla~ passed since the signing of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring 
Peac~ in vretn~~~ Many events have transpired since the signing and I would like to report on 
some of t~ ef~ofr.ts which we made during the conflict and since the ceasefire to obtain an 
accountin&'fo~_~ur men. 
-. lL 
The m6St s~~ificant event concerning our prisoners and missing, of course, was the return 
of ~66 Am!fican -military personnel, 25 U.S. civilians and 9 foreign nationals. 
jc. () .  
As you know, these individuals were taken prisoner while serv1ng in Southeast AS1a. They 
were primarily military personnel of the parties to the conflict and civilians serving in and 
out of the Government in various capacities. 
Their periods of captivity ranged from only a few months to almost nine years. During 
this time they faced deprivations and made sacrifices that few Americans will ever encounter. 
Here at home, the families of our captured and missing endured the frustration and uncertainty 
of waiting for some word about the condition or status of their loved ones. These families 
and the Government were joined by countless Americans in a concerted effort to obtain a full 
~ and accurate accounting of all the men, together with humane treatment and release of those 
held captive. 
These efforts took many forms. Private citizens and organizations transmitted innumerable 
letters and petitions to Communist leaders, and traveled to foreign capitals around the world 
to stimulate concern and interest in this humanitarian issue. The United States Government 
urged all nations to assist in these efforts. These appeals were made through the United 
Nations, other governments, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and many national 
Red Cross societies. The United States appealed again and again to the North Vietnamese to 
abide by the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. The Congress 
held hearings and passed many resolutions condemning the enemy for its failure to abide by 
this convention. 
This genuine congressional concernhas been further manifested in the enactment of 
significant legislation aimed specifically at the solution of some of the problems and 
difficulties faced by the families of our missing and captured men. 
These efforts created widespred public interest and aroused world opinion over the plight 
of our men held captive. This public outcry undoubtedly reached the attention of North 
Vietnamese leaders and influenced their actions on these issues. Our returning prisoners have 
confirmed our beliefs that these efforts resulted in improved treatment for them. 
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Throughout the conflict in Southeast Asia, the United States Government attempted through 
a number of avenues to obtain information about all Americans believed captured or listed as 
missing. For example, in August 1965, the International Committee of the Red Cross CICRC) 
addressed an appeal to the principal parties to the Vietnam conflict, calling on them to 
abide by "the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Convention." It reminded North Vietnam, 
the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) and the United States that all were parties to the 
conventions and sent a copy of the appeal to the National Liberation Front (NLF) on the 
ground that it, too, was bound the undertakings signed by Vietnam. 
The ICRC appeal specified five points: 
·The ICRC should be permitted to serve as a neutral intermediary; 
·Prisoners of war (PWs) should be treated humanely; 
·PW lists should be exchanged; 
·ICRC delegates should be authorized to visit PW camps;-and 
·Civilians should be spared the ordeal of captivity. 
In separate letters to the ICRC, North Vietnam and the NLF declared that the Geneva 
Convention did not apply to the conflict, and in particular refused to accept the ICRC as a 
neutral intermediary. Although acknowledging that it had acceded to the convention in 1957, 
the Hanoi government said it did not apply to those captured because there had been no 
declaration of war. This reasoning completely ignored Article 2 of the convention which 
states that the convention applies in all cases of armed conflict between two or more parties 
to the convention. 
In marked contrast, the United States and the GVN placed great emphasis on compliance with 
the Geneva Convention with respect to the treatment of prisoners of war. They arranged for 
regular ICRC visits to all PW camps in South Vietnam for the inspection facilities and private 
discussions with enemy prisoners of war, provided lists of North Vietnam and NLF prisoners of 
war to the ICRC, and permitted a regular flow of mail to and from the enemy prisoners of war 
as well as visits with families. 
On a few occasions during the period of active U.S. military involvement in the conflict, 
the North Vietnamese released a limited amount of information about captured or missing 
Americans. You may recall that one such release was made to your representatives on 
December 23, 1970. This North Vietnamese document contained the names of 368 American Service-
men. Nine of these were listed as having been previously released, 20 were listed as having 
died, and the remaining 339 were listed as captives. 
While we welcomed Hanoi's implicit acceptance of responsibility for the health and welfare 
of the 339 men, the status of these men was previously known. Moreover, the information in 
this North Vietnamese document was considered incomplete because there was no mention of the 
physical condition of the men indicated as captives, and there was no description of the cause 
of death or disposition of remains of those listed as deceased. Further, the list did not 
include the names of all Americans we believed had been captured and about whom they clearly 
should have had knowledge. 
At no time during the conflict was this kind of information made available by North 
Vietnam or its allies. Although the names of a few men captured in South Vietnam were releas-
ed late in the conflict, no such information with regard to men captured in Laos was forth-
coming until the signing of the cease fire agreement. 
At the time of the signing of the agreement, the United States listed more than 1,900 
Americans as captured or missing. The lists provided by the other side reflected 594 U.S. 
and third country nationals as prisoners. In the ensuing 60 days three more individuals were 
reported and returned. In addition three U.S. personnel, two military and one civilian, were 
released by the People's Republic of China, for a total of 600 American and foreign national 
prisoners released. The lists also included the names of 70 persons said to have died in 
captivity. 
While we are profoundly grateful for the return of these men, our joy and sense of accomp-
lishment are tempered by the fact that more than 1,300 others listed by our Government as 
missing and caputred did not return. Some feared that with the return of the prisoners, we 
would forget those unaccounted for and ignore the plight of their families. I can assure you 
this has not happened, nor will it happen. The Department of Defense will continue to seek 
the fullest possible accounting for these man and provide all possible assistance to their 
families, just as we have in the past. We shall also seek to search for, and recover the 
remains of, those listed as deceased but whose remains have not been recovered. 
Having provided the background of our efforts to achieve these goals, I want to say some-
thing about our efforts during this past year to account for the missing. 
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Our first efforts were made in the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, which was 
established in accordance with Article 16 of the agreement. This commission was charged with 
implementing certain specific articles of the agreement, including those concerned with the 
return of military and foreign civilian prisoners of war and accounting for the missing in 
action. The commission began its work on January 31, 1973, and was limited to 60 days of 
operation. 
The U.S. delegation made every effort to implement and enforce the provisions of the agree-
ment. It planned and executed the withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces and negotiated the 
release and return of the U.S. and foreign prisoners of war. It also played a major role in 
negotiating the repatriation of the military prisoners of the two South Vietnamese parties. 
During this period, 26,508 Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) and 4,956 Republic of 
Vietnam (RVN) prisoners of war were repatriated, most of ~hom were transported in U.S. aircr~t 
In addition to these duties, the U.S. delegation began efforts on February 1, 1973 to 
obtain an accounting of the missing and the repatriation of remains of those listed as decea~d 
The Communist delegations acknowledged their responsiblity for this action but were not 
receptive to our overtures for early resolution of the problem. 
Our initiative in this vein continued throughout the entire 60 days without substantive 
results. 
When the Joint Military Commission ended its activities the Four-Party Joint Military 
Team (FPJ~IT) was formed. This team, as prescribed by the agreement, has the single responsibi-
lity of implementing Article 8(b) of the agreement. This article deals strictly with account-
ing for the mission and the return of the remains of those who have died. 
The U.S. delegation of the FPJMT consists of 15 military and 6 U.S. civilian personnel. 
It began its work on April 2, 1973. Our chief of delegation, an Army colonel, is responsible 
through the Defense Attache Office in Saigon and the U.S. Support Activity Group in Thailand 
to the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific. Our delegation receives policy guidance and 
instructions from the American Ambassador in Saigon. 
The FPJMT has been meeting approximately twice a week since April 4, 1973. The U.S. and 
RVN delegations have made numerous initiatives and attempts since that time to achieve 
compliance by the other side with the provisions of Article 8(b). Despite these efforts, the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and PRG have not been forthcoming with any significant 
information on the missing and dead. 
Beginning with the first meeting, we proposed immediate discussion of plans for the return 
of the remains of those listed as having died in captivity and for the exchange of information 
onl .. the missing. We pursued first the issue of return of remains of those listed as deceased, 
believing this represented an action that could be completed without delay and one which 
would provide the basis for future progress. Instead of responding to our purely humaintarian 
requests, the DRV and PRG have insisted on discussing issues that are not within the purview 
of the FPJMT, and have even attempted to renegotiate points that had been previously agreed 
upon in the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. 
Additionally, from the beginning of negotiations in that forum, they have insisted on 
discussion and linkage of other unrelated parts of the basic agreement. For example, they 
have repeatedly attempted to link Article 8(a), which governs the return of military prisoners 
and foreign civilian personnel, and Article 8(b) which is the sole responsibility of the FPJMT 
to Article 8(c) which relates to Vietnamese civilian detainees. Article 8(c) itself clearly 
specifies that the civilian detainee issue is the responsibility of the two South Vietnamese 
parties. 
During this same time frame, the United States provided the other delegations with detail-
ed listings of all known U.S. and third country nationals missing in Indochina. The DRV and 
PRG accepted these lists and as~ured us they would provide whatever information they possessed. 
To further assist with the accounting for the missing, the United States, at the request 
of the DRV and RVN, agreed to provide a weekly liaison flight between Saigon and Hanoi. This 
mission, using U.S. Air Force C-130 aircraft, began operating on April 7, 1973. 
In mid-April, after discussing plans to exhume and repatriate the remains of those listed 
as having died in captivity, the DRV and PRG assured us of their cooperation of this issue, 
but emphasized the need for agreement on general modalities before proceeding to specific 
operations. While we recognized the need for agreement on broad principles governing 
activities to account for the missing, we also insisted that immediate progress could be made 
on the simple and clear-cut issue of the return of remains of the dead. 
The DRV then proposed that the FPJMT visit the cemeteries of the dead before repatriation 
could begin. They stated that visits to cemeteries in North Vietnam could be made in May and 
that DRV officials would be prepared at that time to discuss the U.S. plans for the 
repatriation of the remains. 
The first visit was made on May 11 to the Van Dien Cemetery, approximately 15 miles south-
west of Hanoi. The team was shown three graves allegedJy containing the remains of U.S. 
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On October 2, to cite another example, the U.S. proposed discussion of the exchange of 
information on the missing and deceased and the FPJMT responsibilities for third country 
nationals. The PRG response was the reading of a 25-minute statement on alleged ceasefire 
violations. The U.S. delegate ignored these charges by restating the proposed agenda. This 
was followed by a 3D-minute harangue by the PRG reiterating its earlier statement. 
In sum, the U.S. and South Vietnamese delegations have made many substantive proposals 
during the FPJMT meetings of the past 10 months that would advance the work of resolving 
the status of the missing. In every case, these efforts have been rebuffed by the DRV and 
PRG. They prefer instead to tie up the sessions with discussions of nongermane and political 
issues. 
This lack of progress has not gone unchallenged. The U.S. delegation has made repeated 
protests to the DRV and PRG, all to no avail. 
In a detailed statement during the FPJMT meeting on September 27, the U.S. delegation in 
Saigon systematically reviewed the U.S. efforts to obtain implementation of Article 8(b) by 
the DRV and PRG, and cited the lack of cooperation and humanitarian spirit demonstrated by 
the other side. This statement, as with our previous efforts, was rejected. 
Despite this complete lack of cooperation from the DRV and PRG, we have made some progress 
in the resolution of missing cases as a result of search operations by teams of the Joint 
Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). This organization is a joint task force located at Nakhon 
Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base in northeast Thailand. Within the limits imposed upon it, 
the JCRC supervises and conducts search operations designed to assist in resolving the fate 
of the missing and to recover and identify remains where possible. The entire operation is 
peaceful, open and humanitarian in nature. 
Our teams have been operating thus far in South Vietnam with the approval of that govern-
ment. Requests for our teams to conduct searches are formally circulated through the FPJMT 
to obtain the approval of the party controlling the territory. All delegations are fully 
informed of our intended searches and are provided detailed schedules of these programmed 
operations. Further, all delegations are invited to accompany the American teams to observe 
each operation. Up to now only the RVN has accepted our invitation to observe these operatioTIS 
The JCRC has conducted a total of 15 of these operations since May of last year. All 
have been conducted in RVN-controlled territory. We have made requests to enter Communist 
territory to conduct searches but so far, permission to do so has been denied. 
The last operation was conducted on December 15. In keeping with established procedures, 
the U.S. delegation requested permission from the RVN to conduct a search of a known crash 
site near Saigon. All delegations were informed of this request and the RVN granted 
permission for the team to enter the area. On December 13 the teams, wearing the traditional 
orange FPJMT insignia, conducted an initial survey of the site. On December 14, in keeping 
with normal policy, members of the news media visited the site and observed operations. On 
December 15 the search tern returned to the site to continue its work. Immediately upon 
landing, they were attacked by a hostile force of undetermined numbers. In keeping with 
established policy, the American teamleader raised his hands in the international sign of 
surrender and shouted in Vietnames that they were unarmed. He was killed almost immediately 
by the attacking force. One of the RVN accompanying him was also killed. In addition, four 
Americans and three Vietnamese were wounded and one helicopter was destroyed. This was 
nothing more than a coldblooded, calculated attack on an unarmed group which was engaged in 
a humanitarian mission. The DRV and PRG were aware of the purpose of this mission. They 
were informed of all of the details and had been extended the traditional invitation to 
accompany the team. 
The United States has vigorously protested this coldblooded murder. Both the U.S. chief 
of delegation and the RVN chief of delegation strongly condemned this attack in the plenary 
session of December 18. Following the delivery of their protest, both delegations walked out 
of the meeting, for the first time in these negotiations. 
It is interesting to note the PRG refused to attend the next scheduled session. They 
stated they were displeased with the attitude and actions of the U.s. delegation. They have 
denied responsibility for the incident and have attempted to divert attention by stating that 
the search was illegal and was nothing more than a reconnaissance mission for military 
purposes. Nothing could be further from the truth. As I previously stated, the mission of 
searching for the missing and dead by the JCRC is open, peaceful and strictly humanitarian. 
Prior to and following the attack on the team there were a number of media reports that 
the JCRe would soon cease operations and give up the search for the missing. I want to 
assure you we have no intentions of reducing our efforts in this work. We have no plans to 
dilute the mission of the JeRe, or to reduce its capability to perform this task. We are, 
though, currently limited in the number of sites we can inspect. As I stated earlier, the 
DRV and PRG have not allowed our teams to enter areas they control. It is in these areas 
that some 95 percent of our known crash of gravesites are located, and we hope the DRV and 
PRG will see fit to allow searches in these areas in the future. 
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While the number of known sites in South Vietnamese territory are limited, we are receivng 
new information on possible crash and gravesites on a regular basis as a result of a publicity 
campaign aimed at enlisting the aid of the local inhabitants of areas in which our men became 
missing. All of this information is being carefully analyzed for its validity and usefulness 
in planning future searches. 
I realize this statement has not reported the successes for which we all had hoped, and 
has not presented a particularly bright picture for the future. We have explored many avenues 
and initiatives on behalf of our men who did not return from Southeast Asia and we have met 
with frustration and indifference on the part of the Communist delegations. Since the 
signing of the agreement last year the other side has yet to provide, through the FPJMT, 
information about a single missing American. Even though the North Vietnamese have refused 
to implement their previous1y-agreed-upon arrangements for the return of the remains of our 
men whom they have listed as deceased, we are determined to continue our efforts on behalf of 
these men and their families. 
I mentioned in the beginning of my testimony the great efforts which were made in behalf 
of our prisoners and missing by the American public, private organizations, and the American 
Government, including the Congress. These unified efforts were helpful then and we welcome 
the continuing interest in this humanitarian cause evidenced by this hearing today. Those 
with who we negotiate in Indochina have shown that they are particularly sensitive to the 
efforts and statements of the members of Congress, and I am sure that they will be attentive 
to the interest in the plight of our missing and their families shown by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee." 
COMMANDERS DIGEST 28 March 1974 
